

Honorable Maureen McKee  
October 19, 2018 @ 10 am at Initial Hearing

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KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

IRENE WALL and ROBERT MORGAN,

Petitioners,

v.

CITY OF SEATTLE, a Washington  
Municipal Corporation; 70<sup>th</sup> &  
GREENWOOD AVE, LLC and OJD, LLC,  
Washington limited liability companies,

Respondents.

NO. 18-2-21317-7 SEA

OPPOSITION BY PETITIONERS TO  
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY  
JUDGMENT

**I. INTRODUCTION AND RELIEF REQUESTED**

The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by the project Developer and the City (together, "Respondents") is plagued with material factual and legal errors and omissions that collectively misrepresent the contents of the document SDCI published on April 9, 2018, the applicable legal framework for

1 contract rezone decisions, and the nature of the claim in Section 7.4 of  
2 Petitioners' Land Use Petition that Respondents seek to dismiss.

3 Respondents' motion should be denied because the section of the  
4 Petition they seek to dismiss does not present a jurisdictional issue at all and is  
5 therefore not appropriate for resolution at the initial hearing in a Land Use  
6 Petition Act ("LUPA") proceeding. See RCW 36.70C.080(2)(procedural and  
7 jurisdiction motions may be addressed at initial hearing). Section 7.4 alleges  
8 that the City Council decision was *ultra vires* because the Council lacked the  
9 authority to make a decision, sitting in a quasi-judicial capacity where it is  
10 required to apply applicable law and existing legislative standards, that the  
11 Council's decision admits have not been adopted. See *e.g.*, Petition at §7.4.8.  
12 Respondents, however, misrepresent this claim as a time-barred attack on a  
13 so-called administrative "Zoning Decision" they claim was made earlier in the  
14 process.

15 Even if Respondents' motion could somehow be construed to raise  
16 jurisdictional issues, the motion still should be denied because Respondents  
17 failed to offer any evidence of where or when the "Zoning Decision" (a title  
18 invented by Respondents for this motion and found nowhere in the Land Use  
19 Code or in the April 9, 2018 decision) was actually "issued" as required by  
20 LUPA. See RCW 36.70C.040(3)& (4). The document that SDCI published on  
21 April 9, 2018, had three – and only three – components: (1) Analysis and  
22 Decision related to Design Review where the Director accepted the Design  
23 Review Board's recommendations on the building design; (2) an Analysis and  
24 Recommendation on the Applicant's request to rezone the property to a 55-foot  
25 height pursuant to the contract rezone criteria in SMC 23.34; and (3) SEPA

1 (State Environmental Policy Act) Analysis. There is no “Zoning Decision” in  
2 that document, nor did Respondents offer any other evidence of when the so-  
3 called “Zoning Decision” was issued as required by LUPA. RCW  
4 36.70C.040(4). Without evidence to support their alleged jurisdictional defect,  
5 the Respondents’ motion must be denied.

6 And finally, even giving Respondents the benefit of the doubt that their  
7 stated “Type 1” “Zoning Decision” was somehow issued on April 9, 2018 as  
8 they allege, that “decision” is not an appealable “land use decision” within the  
9 meaning of LUPA, so it could not trigger LUPA’s twenty-one day appeal period  
10 under RCW 36.70C.040(3). On April 9, 2018 when SDCI published its report  
11 and the alleged “Zoning Decision” Respondents insist it contains, there had not  
12 yet been a “final determination by a local jurisdiction’s body or officer with the  
13 highest level of authority to make the determination . . . on [a]n application for a  
14 project permit or other governmental approval required by law before real  
15 property may be improved, developed [or] modified . . . .” RCW  
16 36.70C.020(2)(a)(emphasis added). That final determination was rendered by  
17 the City Council on August 6, 2018, not by SDCI as Respondents contend.  
18 Even the April 9, 2018 document itself stated that the required Master Use  
19 Permit could not be approved for issuance until the Council land use decision  
20 was made.<sup>1</sup>

21 Where, as here, a developer requests a contract rezone to change the  
22 zoning of its property to allow a specific building, it is the City Council, acting in  
23 its quasi-judicial capacity that makes those final decisions whether to approve  
24 the rezone and require any specific limitations on the type of development that

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<sup>1</sup> SDCI Analysis at 45.

1 may occur. Accordingly in this case, the City Council is the local jurisdiction's  
2 body with the "highest level of authority" to make the "final determination" on a  
3 project permit application required for property to be developed. RCW  
4 36.70C.020(2)(a). The Seattle Land Use Code and LUPA provide for a single  
5 consolidated judicial appeal, and that appeal period was triggered at the  
6 Council Land Use Decision on August 6, 2018, from which Petitioners timely  
7 appealed. Because the "Zoning Decision" that allegedly occurred on April 9,  
8 2018 was not a "land use decision" within the meaning of LUPA, it did not  
9 trigger LUPA's jurisdictional clock and therefore Respondents have failed to  
10 establish that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Section 7.4 claim in the  
11 Petition.

12 Moreover, the bifurcated approach that Respondents advocate not only  
13 violates the consolidated appeal process outlined in SMC 23.76 and RCW  
14 36.70B.060, but it would lead to absurd results and a waste of this Court's time  
15 reviewing a project that may never come to fruition. Until the City Council  
16 approves a contract rezone, no one – not the Developer or SDCI – knows  
17 whether the rezone would be approved, and if approved, the changes that  
18 would be required.

19 For each of these reasons, Respondents' motion should be denied.

## 20 21 **II. RELEVANT FACTS**

### 22 **A. SDCI Analysis, Decision and Recommendation Documents**

23 On April 9, 2018, SDCI provided notice of and published a document  
24 that contained three discrete components related to Respondent Shared Roof's  
25 application for a contract rezone to build a very specific five-story building on

1 land that allowed only a four-story building: (1) A Design Review Decision  
2 pursuant to SMC 23.41 (pages 2-23); (2) A Rezone Analysis and  
3 Recommendation for the Contract Rezone, to ultimately be decided by the City  
4 Council (pages 23-39); and (3) a Determination of Non Significance under the  
5 State Environmental Policy Act (“SEPA”)(pages 39-44) (SDCI Analysis,  
6 Decision and Recommendation). See Declaration of Irene Wall (“Wall Decl.”),  
7 **Ex. 1, SDCI Analysis**; see also Waldman Decl, Ex. A.

8 The document published on April 9, 2018 marked the second time that  
9 SDCI had issued an “Analysis, Decision, and Recommendation” for this project.  
10 Respondents omit that fact from their story and supporting documentation.  
11 SDCI initially recommended approval of this project on January 16, 2018.<sup>2</sup> Wall  
12 Decl, **Ex. 2 SDCI January Analysis**. A public hearing before the Hearing  
13 Examiner was scheduled for Feb 15, 2018. Wall Decl., **Ex.3 Notice**  
14 **documents**. The January 16, 2018 SDCI document, which was almost  
15 indistinguishable from the one SDCI published on April 9, 2018 that is at issue  
16 here, recommended approval of Shared Roof’s contract rezone application  
17 dated December 6, 2016. Respondents provide that application<sup>3</sup> (e.g.,  
18 Waldman Decl. at ¶16; Clawson Decl. at Ex. B). However, Respondents omit  
19 mention of the prior January 16, 2018 decision, presumably because  
20 acknowledgement of that decision would undercut the basis for their motion for  
21 partial summary judgment.

22 Both the initial December 2016 application and SDCI’s January 2018  
23 decision were withdrawn before the scheduled public hearing occurred. The

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25 <sup>2</sup> SDCI issued a revised notice on January 25, 2018, but did not change its decision document  
or the date of the Hearing Examiner public hearing.

<sup>3</sup> That application requested a rezone to the NC2-65 zone.

1 hearing scheduled for February 15, 2018 was cancelled on February 12, 2018,  
2 and SDCI rescinded and withdrew its Analysis, Decision, and Recommendation  
3 on February 20, 2018 with an explanation that the Applicant had filed a revised  
4 application on which there would be a new notice and comment period. See  
5 **Notice Documents at Ex. 3** to Wall Decl. SDCI published a new notice of the  
6 revised application on February 20, 2018, and it was that revised application  
7 that gave rise to the April 9, 2018 SDCI Analysis, Decision and  
8 Recommendation (or simply, "SDCI Analysis") at issue here.

9         The revised application sought approval to a forthcoming NC2-55 zone,  
10 instead of to the NC2-65 foot zoning category requested in the original  
11 application, but made no changes to the position of the building relative to the  
12 property and zoning lines. On the zoning compliance issues that Respondents  
13 challenge here, SDCI's Analysis of January 16, 2018 does not differ from its  
14 Analysis of April 9, 2018. Apparently, by Respondents' logic, the appeal period  
15 on the zoning compliance issues would have already run and become final and  
16 unappealed prior to the later rescission of that decision. Respondents' motion  
17 does not address the procedural conundrum resulting from treating SDCI staff  
18 review as somehow creating a final determination.

19         The April 9, 2018 SDCI Analysis started the last stages of the decision-  
20 making process for the Developer's requested Contract Rezone, a quasi-  
21 judicial Council Land Use Decision where the City Council, after receiving a  
22 recommendation from the Hearing Examiner, makes the final decisions on (1)  
23 whether to rezone the land, and (2) whether to impose conditions on the  
24 specific building that the Applicant seeks to build.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> A contract rezone, described in more detail *infra*, II.E.

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2 **B. The proposed project**

3 This controversial project in the Phinney Ridge neighborhood is a  
4 request to upzone two lots totaling approximately 12,000+ square feet on the  
5 northwest corner of Greenwood Avenue North and N. 70th Street to create a  
6 five story building that would not otherwise be allowed. The 55+ foot building  
7 would be topped with a massive 12-foot high greenhouse on a street in Phinney  
8 Ridge where the nearest property zoned to more than four stories is almost a  
9 mile away, and every commercial lot, including the ones at issue in this appeal,  
10 share their rear boundaries with single family homes. See Petition at §7.1.1-  
11 §7.1.4.

12 The Developer is a group of friends who call themselves “Shared Roof.”  
13 In public presentations and in their application, this group has stated that they  
14 and their families plan to occupy the units on the fourth and fifth floors of the  
15 proposed building, where the plan sets show units substantially larger than the  
16 second and third floor units that would be available to the public.<sup>5</sup> Respondents  
17 assert without proof that the project “includes affordable multifamily units,”  
18 Motion at 2, when the published plan documents suggest this may not be  
19 accurate.

20 In addition to the two commercial lots proposed for rezone, the  
21 Developer owns the two lots in the adjacent single family (SF5000) zone that  
22 together border the entire west side (rear property line) of the commercial  
23 properties proposed for rezone. One lot (Lot # 287710-4127) is a vacant, mid-  
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25 <sup>5</sup> Respondents’ appear to have backed off the narrative that the owners will live in the building with their families that they touted throughout this process, and now state that there is only one owner, Chad Dale, and he wants to build this for his family. Motion at 2.

1 block lot on N. 70th Street. The east side of that lot abuts the rear property line  
2 of the southern NC parcel (Lot # 287710-4085). The other lot (Lot # 287710-  
3 4120), at 7010 Palatine Ave N (the street west of Greenwood), contains a  
4 classic old craftsman house and shares a rear boundary with the northern NC  
5 parcel proposed for rezone (Lot # 287710-4100). See Petition, §7.1.2; See  
6 *also* Wall Decl., **Ex. 1 SDCI Analysis** at 2-3.

7         The two single family lots are not included in the rezone request. But the  
8 Developer drew a line around all four lots (each has a separate legal  
9 description and tax parcel number), called all four lots a “Development Site,” (a  
10 term that is not defined in the Land Use Code), and asserted that none of the  
11 Code requirements that require building setbacks on commercial lots that abut  
12 lots in residential zones, or that restrict access from single family to commercial  
13 zones applied to this project because all of the lots were a single “Development  
14 Site.” Aided and abetted by SDCI, which allowed this artifice even though there  
15 was no law to support it, the Developer forged ahead with a building  
16 substantially larger than allowed by Code. Instead of complying with setback  
17 provisions in SMC 23.47A.014 that mandated all upper floors above the first  
18 floor be set back at least 15 feet from the zoning line, and other restrictions that  
19 eased the transition between commercial and adjacent single family zones, the  
20 approved project was a massive 55+ building with all but a few feet of the upper  
21 floor built right on the shared property line, blocking the light and air corridor for  
22 the whole block. Because the building rose right on the property line, it relied  
23 on access from the adjacent single family zone, which also is prohibited by the  
24 Land Use Code. SDCI received, but ignored, public comments demonstrating  
25 that this “Development site” gimmick was unlawful. Wall Decl. at **Ex. 4 (Public**

1 **comments of 2/8/17), Ex. 5 (Comments of 5/1/17), and Ex. 6 (Comments of**  
2 **3/18/18).**

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4 **C. Design Review Process**

5 This project went through “design review” where, in public meetings,  
6 SDCI took public comment, the Developer presented its design to members of  
7 a Design Review Board, and the Board opined on the project’s compliance with  
8 the City’s Design Guidelines (which are not within the Land Use Code) and  
9 made design recommendations, pursuant to authority under SMC Chapter  
10 23.41. The design review process informs SDCI’s Design Review Decision, but  
11 the design review process is independent of any zoning review of a project.  
12 During the Design Review process and before SDCI issued its Design Review  
13 Decision, SDCI accepted public comments. *See e.g.,* Wall Decl. at Exhibits 4,  
14 5 and 6, *supra*.

15 SDCI’s Design Review Decision in its April 9, 2018 document is identical  
16 to what it published in its January 16, 2018. Compare Wall Decl **Ex. 1. SDCI**  
17 **April 9, 2018 Analysis** at 22-23 and **Ex. 2 January 16, 2018 Analysis**, at 22-  
18 23. Neither document mentions or contains any “Zoning Decision,” nor does it  
19 contain any “analysis” of the project’s compliance with development standards  
20 as SDCI Supervisor Cheryl Waldman asserts in her sworn declaration.  
21 Waldman Decl. at ¶12.

22 The SDCI Analysis states clearly on the last page that “Projects requiring  
23 a Council land use action shall be considered ‘approved for issuance’ following  
24 the Council’s decision.” Wall Decl., **Ex. 1 SDCI Analysis** at 45. That is  
25 because, unlike an application for a permit that does not require a Council land

1 use action, SDCI's Design Review decision is not the end of the road for a  
2 project involving a contract rezone, such as the case at hand. This project  
3 requires a Council Land Use Decision before a permit is approved for issuance.  
4 SMC 23.76.028.C.1, C.3 (For a Type 1 or Type II Master Use Permit that also  
5 requires a Council land use action, the Master Use Permit is approved for  
6 issuance only after the Council land use decision is made). That is because the  
7 Land Use Code establishes different types of decisions, made by different  
8 decision makers, and the zoning for the site and applicable development  
9 standards are not resolved until the City Council acts on the rezone application.

#### 10 **D. Land Use decision framework**

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12 The Land Use Code, as required by RCW 36.70B.060, provides  
13 procedures for “an integrated and consolidated land use permit process,” that  
14 integrates environmental review and provides “for the consolidation of appeals  
15 for all land use decisions.” SMC 23.76.002 (emphasis added); SMC  
16 23.76.004.G (consolidated process). The Land Use Code categorizes five  
17 types of decisions that may be made by different decision makers and under  
18 different processes. SMC 23.76.004.A. Three of those decision types – I, II, IV  
19 -- are relevant to this motion.

20 Type I and II decisions are made by SDCI (referred to as “the Director”  
21 and consolidated into a Master Use Permit (MUP). SMC 23.76.004.B. Type I  
22 and II decisions are components of Master Use Permits . SMC 23.76.006.A.  
23 Type I decisions (such as the “Zoning Decision” that Respondents claim to  
24 have been made), which include the application of development standards to a  
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1 project,<sup>6</sup> are made by the Director and are not subject to administrative review  
2 by the Hearing Examiner without first requesting (and paying fees of over  
3 \$3,000) an “Interpretation” where SDCI explains the basis for any Type I  
4 decisions it has made. SMC 23.76.004.B; SMC 23.76.006.B; SMC 23.76.022;  
5 SMC 23.88.020. Until 2017, an Interpretation was a required administrative  
6 remedy before seeking judicial review. But the City Council eliminated that  
7 requirement through its enactment of Ordinance 125387, Wall Decl., **Ex. 7**  
8 **(Interpretation amendment)** at 4, 5 (showing Code changes to SMC  
9 23.76.022 and 23.88.020).; Wall Decl. **Ex. 8 (Staff memo for interpretation**  
10 **amendment).**

11 Type I decisions may be appealed directly to Superior Court under LUPA  
12 at the appropriate time. Even though no public notice is required for Type I  
13 decisions, SMC 23.76.020.C, in order to exist a Type I decision must be  
14 articulated in some form. In any event, SDCI’s Analysis of April 9, 2018  
15 contains only three approvals, not a fourth “Zoning Decision” as asserted by  
16 Respondents.<sup>7</sup>

17 Type II decisions are discretionary decisions made by SDCI that are  
18 subject to an administrative open record appeal to the Hearing Examiner. SMC  
19 23.76.004.B; SMC 23.76.006.C. SDCI issued two Type II decisions on April 9,  
20 2018: A Design Review Decision and a SEPA determination. Petitioners did  
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23 <sup>6</sup> At SMC 23.76.004, Table A, however, the Code states that this type of Type I decision is  
24 limited to “Application of development standards for decisions not otherwise designated Type II,  
III, IV, or V.” (Emphasis added.)

25 <sup>7</sup> Even though Respondents’ Motion uses the words “Zoning Decision” at least 28 times (by  
Petitioners’ count), that term does not appear even once within the SDCI’s Analysis  
Respondents claim contained such a decision.

1 not appeal those decisions, and those decisions are not relevant to this motion  
2 or to the LUPA appeal.

3 Type IV decisions are “Council land use decisions,” quasi judicial  
4 decisions made by the City Council pursuant to existing legislative standards  
5 and based on the Hearing Examiner’s record and recommendation.” SMC  
6 23.76.004.C. This case involves a Type IV Council land use decision because  
7 the Developer requested an amendment to the Official Land Use Map to  
8 upzone its property. SMC 23.76.036.A.1. In a Type IV quasi-judicial  
9 proceeding the City Council sits as would any other quasi-judicial decision  
10 maker and applies the law as written, without any legislative capacity to change  
11 the law. SMC 23.76.056.A (apply applicable law); SMC 23.76.004.C (existing  
12 legislative standards).

13 The Council issued its Type IV Council Land Use Decision on August 6,  
14 2018, which adopted the Hearing Examiner’s Findings and Conclusions,  
15 modified certain aspects of the Project, and passed an ordinance that granted  
16 the requested rezone, subject to execution of a Property Use and Development  
17 Agreement (PUDA). Wall Decl., **Ex.9 (Council Findings) and Ex. 10**  
18 **(Ordinance & PUDA)**.

19

20 **E. The Contract Rezone decision-making process**

21 A contract rezone is an amendment to the Official Land Use Map subject  
22 to the execution, delivery, and recording of a Property Use and Development  
23 Agreement. SMC 23.84A.032 (“Rezone, contract”). A Property Use and  
24 Development Agreement is an agreement executed by the owner of the  
25 property to be rezoned that subjects the property to restrictions on its use and

1 development” that are ultimately imposed by the City Council SMC  
2 23.84A.030; *see also*, 23.34.004 -.009. Thus, the scope of the development is  
3 not set until the City Council acts. Coming at the end of the processs, the  
4 Council Land Use decision is the “final determination” that triggers LUPA’s 21-  
5 day appeal period. RCW 36.70C.040(2)(a);RCW 36.70C.040(3); RCW  
6 36.70C.040(4)(b). That decision was made on August 6, 2018 which  
7 Petitioners timely appealed.

### 8 9 **1. SDCI Recommendation**

10 For Type IV Council Land Use decisions, SDCI must prepare a written  
11 report that shall include, among other requirements, responses to written  
12 comments from the public; an evaluation of the proposal based on the  
13 standards and criteria for the approval sought and consistency with applicable  
14 City policies; all environmental documentation; and the Director’s  
15 recommendation to approve, approve with conditions, or deny a proposal.  
16 SMC 23.76.050. SDCI published its report which recommended approval of  
17 the proposed rezone, on April 9, 2018, along with its Type II Design Review  
18 Decision and the Type II SEPA Decision published that same day. Wall Decl.,  
19 **Ex. 1 SDCI Analysis**, at 23-39. But SDCI’s report did not provide any  
20 responses to written comments from the public, even though it had received  
21 numerous comments relating to the proposal’s failure to comply with  
22 development standards and SDCI’s treatment of the Developer’s assemblage  
23 of 4 parcels as a single “development site” as a device to evade compliance  
24 with those standards. *See e.g.*, Wall Decl., **Ex. 4, 5, & 6 (Comment letters to**  
25 **SDCI)**.

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## 2. Hearing Examiner Open Record Hearing

The Hearing Examiner holds an open record pre-decision hearing to consider SDCI’s Analysis and establish the record for the Type IV Council Land Use decision. SMC 23.76.052.A; SMC 23.76.052.F. At the hearing, the Examiner accepts evidence and comments on “[t]he Director’s report, including an evaluation of the project based on applicable City ordinances and policies” and SDCI’s recommendation to approve, approve with conditions, or deny the application. SMC 23.76.052.E.1(emphasis added). In this case, substantial evidence was presented to the Examiner that SDCI’s use of a “development site” to evade compliance with applicable development standards was unlawful. Wall Decl., **Ex. 11, 12 (Public comments on non-compliance with zoning)**.

## 3. Hearing Examiner Recommendation

From Information received at the Hearing, the Examiner submits a written recommendation to the Council to approve, approve with conditions or deny an application. SMC 23.76.052.H (Emphasis added.). In other words, the Examiner is not supposed to simply rubber-stamp the material received from SDCI. But in this case, the Examiner ignored all evidence and argument challenging SDCI’s improper use of the term “development site” and accepted SDCI’s treatment of the Developer’s property as a single “development site” without even acknowledging that such treatment was contested.<sup>8</sup> Instead, in a Recommendation dated June 5, 2018, the Examiner essentially rubber-

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<sup>8</sup> The Hearing Examiner’s Recommendation at Findings 2 and 3 and Conclusion 7, ¶¶3 and 4 employ and embrace the term “development site.”

1 stamped SDCI's flawed recommendation to approve the project, Wall Decl., **Ex.**  
2 **13 Hearing Examiner Recommendation**, notwithstanding substantial  
3 evidence showing this recommendation was unlawful.

4 Any interested party may appeal the Hearing Examiner's  
5 Recommendation to the Council as part of the Council's quasi-judicial  
6 proceeding. SMC 23.76.054. The Petitioners in this case timely appealed the  
7 Hearing Examiner's recommendation. That Appeal at pp 4-9 and 19-20  
8 included a challenge to SDCI and the Examiner's use of the artifice,  
9 "development site," as a means of allowing the Developer's project to evade the  
10 zoning restrictions within SMC 23.42.030 and 23.47A.014. Wall Decl., **Ex. 14**  
11 **(Appeal to City Council)**.

#### 12 **4. Council Land Use Decision**

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14 In a Type IV Council land use decision, the Council makes the final  
15 decision, in a quasi-judicial proceeding, whether to approve, approve with  
16 conditions, remand, or deny the application, after considering the record, the  
17 Hearing Examiner's recommendation, and any appeal of the Examiner's  
18 Recommendation. SMC 23.76.054; SMC 23.76.056. That decision is required  
19 to be based on applicable law and supported by substantial evidence in the  
20 record established at the Hearing Examiner's open record hearing. SMC  
21 23.76.004.C(decision made pursuant to existing legislative standards) and  
22 SMC 23.40.002.B(conformity with regulations). The Council issues Findings  
23 and Conclusions and separately approves an Ordinance that authorizes a very  
24 specific building and other requirements as a condition of the rezone. SMC  
25 23.34.004.

1 The claims regarding use by SDCI and the Examiner of the artifice of  
2 “development site” to evade enforcement of zoning restrictions under SMC  
3 23.42.030 and 23.47A.014 were squarely presented to the City Council.  
4 Petitioners provided extensive material showing how the Examiner’s  
5 Recommendation was wrong. Wall Decl., **Ex. 14 (Appeal to council) and Ex.**  
6 **15 (Petitioners’ Reply)** at pp7-11). Petitioners also supplied the Council with  
7 an exhibit showing the project’s numerous zoning violations. Wall Decl., **Ex. 16**  
8 **(Illustrative Exhibit)**

9 The Council considered, but ultimately rejected, a set of Findings that  
10 would have rejected Hearing Examiner Conclusion #7 and would have instead  
11 imposed the required setbacks and access limitations required by the Land Use  
12 Code. Wall Decl., **Ex. 17 Council Staff Memorandum**. If the Council had  
13 adopted those findings, the project would not suffer from its fatal flaw, as  
14 alleged in §7.1 of the Petition, of a 4+ story building rising right on the property  
15 line in violation of the mandatory rezone criteria in SMC 23.34.009.D.2. And  
16 any LUPA challenge would not contain the *ultra vires* allegation in §7.4 that  
17 Respondents now try to dismiss. Thus, the very issues Respondents claim  
18 were already resolved and decided by SDCI on April 9, 2018, remained alive  
19 and at issue before the City Council in its approval of the proposed  
20 development.

21 The Final Council Findings and the ordinance approving the rezone and  
22 accepting a PUDA imposed additional conditions on the project outside the  
23 scope of SDCI’s “decision” on the project and it specifically acknowledged that  
24 SDCI’s use of the term “development site” had no basis in law. Wall Decl, **Ex.**  
25 **10 Ordinance** (third, fourth and fifth recitals). Effectively, the City Council

1 equivocated, by in one breath adopting the Examiner’s Findings and  
2 Conclusions that were predicated upon treating the Developer’s entire  
3 ownership as a single “development site” that disregarded lot lines and zoning  
4 boundaries while stating in the next breath that the City Council had yet to  
5 adopt any regulations or definitions addressing the treatment of lots in different  
6 zones as a single “development site.” The City Council’s decision on that issue  
7 is the “final determination” by the City’s decision-making body with the “highest  
8 level of authority to make that determination...” RCW 36.70C.020(2).

9  
10 **III. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON**

11 This response is supported by the Declaration of Irene Wall in  
12 Opposition to Respondents’ Motion for Partial Summary, and the attached  
13 documents.

14  
15 **IV. ARGUMENT**

16 Respondents’ Motion should be denied because the section of the  
17 Petition that Respondents seek to dismiss does not give rise to jurisdictional  
18 issues at all. Respondents’ attempt to mischaracterize it as a jurisdictional  
19 issue fails as a matter of law because Respondents did not produce any  
20 evidence that the so-called “Zoning Decision” was “issued” in a manner  
21 required by LUPA. Nor did they demonstrate that the “Zoning Decision,” even if  
22 deemed “issued,” was actually a “Land use decision” within the meaning of  
23 LUPA because the “decision” on April 9, 2018 related to a project that could not  
24 proceed without a City Council approval that had not yet occurred on that date.  
25 Because there was no “Zoning Decision” made on April 9, 2018 that was a final

1 determination by the highest authority to render a decision on the project  
2 application, there was no “deadline” that Petitioners “missed” that would deprive  
3 this Court of jurisdiction to hear the claim alleged in §7.4 of Appellants’ LUPA  
4 Petition. Respondents’ Motion should be denied.

5  
6 **A. The Motion should be denied because Respondents**  
7 **mischaracterized the claim in §7.4 of the Petition as a jurisdictional**  
8 **issue when, in reality, §7.4 raises a purely merits issue that the Council**  
9 **Land Use Decision was *ultra vires*.**

10 Respondents have tried to create a jurisdictional issue where none  
11 exists. Only procedural and jurisdictional issues may be resolved at the initial  
12 hearing, not those seeking review of the merits of the challenged land use  
13 decision, RCW 36.70C.080, which is the object of Respondents’ Motion.

14 Specifically, Respondents assert that “[a]mong other things in their  
15 LUPA petition, the Petitioners allege that the Project does not comply with  
16 certain zoning standards,” Motion at 1,8-9, and they seek to dismiss §7.4 of the  
17 Petition on the grounds that a so-called “Zoning Decision” is somehow wholly  
18 separate from a “Rezone Approval” and is a stand-alone decision that was  
19 etched in stone before the Council considered the rezone, and was required to  
20 be appealed before the Council final decision. Motion at 10. But a review of  
21 §7.4 confirms it is not simply a claim that the Project does not comply with  
22 certain zoning standards. Rather, it is a claim based specifically on the  
23 Council’s own admission that it behaved unlawfully, and it is a claim rooted in  
24 the doctrine of *ultra vires* actions.

25 It is highly unusual for a legislative body to publicly acknowledge its  
unlawful behavior on the face of its decision, and then try to sweep it under the

1 rug by claiming, in that same document, that the decision that flowed from that  
2 unlawful action had no precedential effect and so, in effect, it didn't matter. But  
3 that is exactly what the Council did in this case. Indeed, Section 7.4 of the  
4 Petition is based on explicit text in the Ordinance that approved the PUDA for  
5 the Shared Roof project. The Council's Ordinance observed in three recitals  
6 that use of the concept of a "development site" had yet to be adopted in  
7 regulations or definitions, but it proceeded to apply the concept and approved  
8 the project anyway. Wall Decl., **Ex.10 Ordinance** at 1.

9 Because Type IV decisions such as the contract rezone issued here,  
10 "are quasi-judicial decisions made by the Council pursuant to existing  
11 legislative standards . . . .", SMC 23.76.006.C, and the Council must "apply the  
12 applicable law based on substantial evidence in the record," SMC 23.76.056  
13 (emphasis added). Petitioners' claim at §7.4 asserts, among other errors, that  
14 the Council engaged in unlawful procedure and acted outside its authority when  
15 it authorized this project despite specifically acknowledging that the  
16 "development site" artifice had no basis in law. Petitioners' claims at §7.4 do  
17 not present a jurisdictional question; the claims go to the substance of the City  
18 Council's decision and are not appropriate for resolution at an initial hearing  
19 reserved for questions of procedure and jurisdiction.<sup>9</sup>

20 Certain sections of §7.4 describe the "development site" artifice – an  
21 imaginary line drawn around the Developer's four contiguous lots that allegedly

22 \_\_\_\_\_  
23 <sup>9</sup> That defect was not cured by claiming the decision had no precedential effect, or claiming that  
24 the Council would later "address policy issues related to 'development sites'". There is no "no-  
25 precedential-effect" exception in the requirements for quasi-judicial actions, and furthermore,  
the Council action in this case is likely to have the precedential effect of encouraging other  
developers to buy adjacent parcels in a different zone, drape them in a "development site," and  
run to Council for a "no-precedential-effect" contract rezone just like the Council gave to Shared  
Roof.

1 caused all internal lot lines to disappear and free the owner from certain Land  
2 Use Code limitations it didn't like – and the Land Use Code provisions that were  
3 not applied as a result of this invented strategy. Petition at §7.4.1 - §7.4.5.  
4 Those descriptions provide context for the *ultra vires* allegation in §7.4, which  
5 squarely challenges the lawfulness of the City Council's action. Respondents,  
6 however, ignore the gravamen of the §7.4, the Council's *ultra vires* use of  
7 "development site" in a quasi-judicial setting, and instead seek to twist the use  
8 of that artifice into a challenge to a decision that Respondents claim was  
9 allegedly "made" four months before. See Motion. at 2, 9. The Court should  
10 reject this tactic.

11

12 **B. Even if the §7.4 claim is considered jurisdictional, the Motion must**  
13 **be denied because Respondents offer no evidence that a "Zoning**  
14 **Decision" was "issued" on April 9, 2018 in a manner required by LUPA.**

15 LUPA has strict requirements for when a land use decision<sup>10</sup> is deemed  
16 "issued." RCW 36.70C.040(4). The date of issuance is when the twenty-one  
17 day jurisdictional clock starts to run. RCW 36.70C.040(3). A "land use  
18 decisions" is "issued" at any of three events (a) three days after mailing or, if  
19 not mailed, upon notice the decision is available; (b) If made by ordinance or  
20 resolution, the date of enactment, or (c) the date the decision is entered into the  
21 public record. RCW 36.70C.040(4).

22 Respondents at 11 assert that the so-called "Zoning Decision" was  
23 "made publicly available on April 9, 2018, the date of publication of the City's  
24 MUP Decision." But, as noted above, that document does not contain any

25 <sup>10</sup> As noted *infra*, Petitioners do not believe there was any "land use decision" made in this case  
even if the so-called "Zoning Decision" could be deemed "issued".

1 statement that the project complies with zoning or development standards. By  
2 case law, the decision claimed to have been issued must "have been  
3 memorialized in some tangible, accessible way, [without which] even the most  
4 diligent citizen cannot know whether the decision is objectionable or, if it is,  
5 whether there is a viable basis for a challenge." *Vogel v. City of Richland*, 161  
6 Wn.App. 770, 780, 255 P.3d 805 (2011)(emphasis supplied).

7         Despite numerous pages claiming a "Zoning Decision" to have been  
8 made on April 9, 2018 and contained within SDCI's Analysis, Respondents fail  
9 to offer any evidence whatsoever of such a "Zoning Decision," *i.e.*, when it was  
10 made, by whom, where it was published, or in any way entered into the public  
11 record as required by LUPA. RCW 36.70C.040(4).

12         The only supposed "evidence" is in the sworn declaration of Cheryl  
13 Waldman, a SDCI supervisor who, notably, does not claim to have personally  
14 made such a decision. She explains that in general a SDCI zoning reviewer  
15 "makes a determination" that a project complies with development standards as  
16 part of zoning review, but she does not indicate who made that decision here or  
17 where that decision is documented in this case. Waldman Decl. at ¶8. Instead,  
18 she simply asserts that "SDCI will not publish a MUP Decision on the Type II  
19 Decisions until the zoning and other review disciplines are reviewed and  
20 approved or conditionally approved." Waldman Decl. at ¶9 In other words, she  
21 simply assumes that the so-called "Zoning Decision" must have been made.

22         LUPA contemplates review of the merits of the claims on the full decision  
23 record, not on a declaration – such as the declaration of SDCI supervisor  
24 Waldman – that was never part of the record. While Waldman may believe that  
25 "SDCI will not publish the MUP Decision on the Type II Decisions until the

1 zoning and other review disciplines are reviewed and approved...”  
2 Respondents have not offered any proof that such a decision was actually  
3 “memorialized in some tangible, accessible way” so that Petitioners could  
4 “know whether the decision is objectionable or ... whether there is a viable  
5 basis for a challenge.” *Vogel, supra*. To be “issued,” a land use decision must  
6 be more than a penumbra.

7 Waldman also proclaims that an “analysis” of the Project’s compliance  
8 with development standards” was “included with a recommendation in the MUP  
9 Decision document and submitted to the Hearing Examiner.” But there is no  
10 such analysis or even mention of the Project’s compliance with development  
11 standards anywhere in the entire 45 page document published on April 9, 2018.  
12 The Design Review Decision portion states only that the Director agrees with  
13 the Design Review Board’s conclusion that the proposed project results in a  
14 design that best meets the intent of the design review guidelines (which are not  
15 zoning regulations) and that SDCI accepted the recommendations of the Board.  
16 Wall Decl., **Ex.1 SDCI Analysis** at 22-23.

17 In the Rezone Recommendation portion of the April 9, 2018 document,  
18 where SDCI could have referenced any alleged “Zoning Decisions”, it gives no  
19 hint of such a decision. In the section for the rezone criteria in SMC  
20 23.34.008.E.2 discussing a preference for physical buffers as an effective  
21 separation between different zones, SDCI references only the design review  
22 process but nothing about compliance with development standards. *Id.* at 32-  
23 33. And where SDCI should have addressed the one and only mandatory  
24 rezone criteria that a “gradual transition in height and scale and level of activity  
25 between zones shall be provided unless major physical buffers are present. . .

1 .”, SMC 23.34.009.D.2, SDCI says nothing at all. It omitted that requirement  
2 entirely. *Id.* at 38-39.<sup>11</sup> This would have been one of several obvious places to  
3 attempt to explain that it had already made a “Zoning Decision” on building  
4 setbacks and other issues.

5 Respondents obviously cannot claim that their cherished “Zoning  
6 Decision” was made by ordinance or legislative body in a quasi judicial  
7 capacity, RCW 36.70C(4)(b), because the only decision that meets that criteria  
8 is the Council Land Use Decision issued on August 6, 2018 that Petitioners  
9 timely appealed. And Respondents offer no evidence – and no argument – that  
10 the so-called “Zoning Decision” was entered into the public record in some  
11 other manner or some other date. RCW 36.70C(4)(c). Without evidence to  
12 support their claim that a “Zoning Decision “ “issued” on April 9, 2018, their  
13 motion fails.

14 In addition to offering no evidence of the “issuance” of a decision on April  
15 9, 2018, Respondents fail to mention at all that SDCI had previously issued a  
16 virtually identical decision on January 16, 2018, when it recommended approval  
17 of the first application. Wall Decl., **Ex. 2 SDCI Analysis, 1/16/18.** If, as  
18 Respondents allege, SDCI issued a jurisdiction-killing “Zoning Decision” on  
19 April 9, 2018, then surely that same “Zoning Decision” existed on January 16,  
20 2018, which was, in parts relevant to Respondents’ motion, identical to the  
21 Decision issued on April 9, 2018. But Respondents omitted mention of the  
22 earlier decision and the procedural problems posed by treating the initial SDCI  
23

24  
25 <sup>11</sup> The Council’s failure to adhere to that requirement is enough to reverse the Council decision  
on the merits (see Petition at §7.1),

1 decision as a final determination whose 21 day limitation period would have run  
2 (under Respondents' view) prior to the decision's withdrawal.

3  
4 **C. Even if the so-called "Zoning Decision" was "issued" on April 9,**  
5 **2018, the Motion must be denied because the City Council had not yet**  
6 **made the final determinations required for project approval and**  
7 **therefore the "Zoning Decision" was not an appealable "Land Use**  
8 **Decision" within the meaning of LUPA at that time.**

9 LUPA defines a "land use decision" as "a final determination by a local  
10 jurisdiction's body or officer with the highest level of authority to make the  
11 determination, including those with authority to hear appeals..." RCW  
12 36.70C.020(2)(a). Respondents at 7 cite the correct law, but misapply it.

13 "A 'final decision' is [o]ne which leaves nothing open to further dispute  
14 and which sets at rest cause of action between parties." *Samuel's Furniture,*  
15 *Inc. v. Dept of Ecology*, 147 Wn.2d 440, 452 (2002). "When read in conjunction  
16 with RCW 36.70C.040(4), [LUPA] provides that a land use decision must be  
17 final before it can be issued." *Vogel*, 161 Wn. App. at 778.

18 **1. The City Council made the final, appealable land use**  
19 **decision.**

20 In this case, the City Council -- not SDCI -- made the final land use  
21 decisions because its approvals were required before any development  
22 occurred on the subject property. SMC 23.76.028.C.1 (Type I MUP cannot be  
23 approved for issuance until Council decision is rendered); SMC 23.76.028.C.3  
24 (Type II MUP cannot be approved for issuance until Council decision is  
25 rendered); SMC 23.76.002 (consolidation of appeals); SMC 23.76.056.D

1 (Council land use decision is final subject to judicial review , which shall be  
2 commenced as provided by state law).

3 Respondents instead offer a misleading and inaccurate explanation of  
4 the Land Use Code framework for contract rezones to create the false  
5 impression that the project that SDCI advanced on April 9, 2018 became final  
6 after twenty-one days passed without an appeal of that decision, even though  
7 the April 9<sup>th</sup> document itself confirms the Code requirement that a MUP is not  
8 approved for issuance until after the Council Land Use Decision is made, Wall  
9 Decl., **Ex. 1 SDCI Analysis** at 45, and the Code provides for both the Hearing  
10 Examiner and Council to make changes to that building based on applicable  
11 law. SMC 23.76.052-.056.

12 To fit the Code to their desired narrative, Respondents at 10 mistakenly  
13 portray the “Rezone Approval” as a “wholly separate approval” from the “Zoning  
14 Decision” they claim SDCI made on April 9, 2018. They claim at 3 that the  
15 contract rezone process is “a separate process tacked onto the end of a typical  
16 project permitting process,” when in fact the whole contract rezone process  
17 was consolidated in this case. They go on at 11 to misstate the authority of the  
18 Examiner and Council to reshape the project design that SDCI advanced. They  
19 recite at 8 a list of cases where a LUPA petition was deemed untimely for  
20 failure to timely file an appeal, without noting that those cases involved a final  
21 permit decision and approval, a material fact lacking here on April 9, 2018 when  
22 Respondents insist an appealable “Zoning Decision” was made.

23 Respondents at 10 mistakenly assert that “The Zoning Decision made by  
24 SDCI on April 9, 2018 is a “final land use decision” because “SDCI is the body  
25 with the highest level of authority to make the determination.” But they leave off

1 the remainder of the definition of a “land use decision,” which states that this  
2 “final determination” is for “an application for a project permit or other  
3 governmental approval required by law before the real property may be  
4 improved, developed, [or] modified. . .” RCW 36.70C.020(2)(a) (emphasis  
5 added). It is undisputed that for the instant contract rezone, no permit issuance  
6 was triggered by the alleged “Zoning Decision” on April 9, 2018 because the  
7 Council had yet to make its decision. See SMC 23.76.028.C.1 (A Type 1 MUP  
8 is approved for issuance after the Director’s decision except where a council  
9 land use decision is also required, and then the MUP is approved for issuance  
10 only after the Council land use decision) and SMC 23.76.028.C.3 (a Type II  
11 MUP is approved for issuance following the expiration of the appeal period  
12 except that a Type II MUP that requires a Council land use decision is  
13 approved for issuance only after the Council land use decision, SMC  
14 23.76.056.D. (Type IV Council land use decision shall be final and conclusive  
15 unless reversed on judicial appeal; judicial review shall be commenced as  
16 provided by state law).

17 Even if SDCI might have the authority in some situations to render a  
18 “final [Type 1] determination,” in this case, on April 9, 2018, SDCI did not make  
19 any “land use decision” about the application of development standards to the  
20 proposed project. The project still required additional reviews by the Hearing  
21 Examiner and the City Council, each of whom had an opportunity to reshape  
22 the project as they deemed necessary, including whether to adopt or reject  
23 SDCI’s use of the “development site” artifice to avoid applying the access and  
24 building setback restrictions of SMC 23.42.030 and 23.47A.014. The required  
25 approvals – a rezone and any conditions on the project – were not piecemealed

1 and piggybacked, as Respondents at 10-11 allege. They occurred together as  
2 one consolidated process and that is evidenced in the Council Findings and in  
3 the Ordinance adopting the PUDA that approved the rezone and the proposed  
4 development. Wall Decl., **Ex. 9 (Council Findings) Ex. 10 (Ordinance &**  
5 **PUDA)**

6 The Council – not SDCI -- was required to make those decisions based  
7 on applicable law and supported by substantial evidence in the record. *Id.* The  
8 Council’s hands were not tied by SDCI’s determinations, if any, on compliance  
9 with development standards because the Council could only approve the  
10 project if it complied with applicable laws, based on substantial evidence before  
11 the Examiner. SMC 23.76.056.A (“The Council’s decision to approve, approve  
12 with conditions, remand, or deny the application for a Type IV Council land use  
13 decision shall be based on applicable law and supported by substantial  
14 evidence in the record. . . .”). Respondents, notably, omit the “based on  
15 applicable law” requirement when they purport to describe the decision-making  
16 process for contract rezones. Motion at 11.

17 The Hearing Examiner, who makes the Record for the Council Land Use  
18 Decision, is also not constrained as Respondents allege. The Hearing  
19 Examiner’s authority is not limited to “taking evidence related to the Director’s  
20 report and analyzing rezone criteria.” Motion at 11. To the contrary, SMC  
21 23.76.052.E (Conduct of Hearing), specifically states that the Hearing Examiner  
22 shall accept evidence and comments regarding . . . [the] director’s report,  
23 including an evaluation of the project based on application of City ordinances  
24 and policies and the Director’s recommendation to approve, approve with  
25 conditions, or deny the application. . . .” The Hearing Examiner could have and

1 should have considered evidence that the “development site” artifice was  
2 unlawful, and that allowing a five story building on the property line with a single  
3 family lot would violate the mandatory zoning criteria in SMC 23.34.009.D.2  
4 (requiring “a gradual transition in height and scale” between zones) *See e.g.*,  
5 Wall Decl., **Ex. 11 & 12 (Public Comments to Examiner)**. Similarly, the  
6 Council could have and should have rejected the contract rezone or  
7 conditioned the project pursuant to the “Modify” Findings, Wall Decl., **Ex. 17**  
8 **(Staff memo)** instead of admitting they were acting unlawfully and attempting  
9 to excuse themselves by claiming their unlawful act had no precedential effect.  
10 Wall Decl, **Ex. 10 (Ordinance, sixth recital)**. Petitioner’s claim in §7.4 offers  
11 this Court an opportunity to right the wrong that City officials so willingly  
12 overlooked, and to confirm that the City Council, when acting in its quasi-  
13 judicial capacity, must apply the law, not ignore the law, or attempt to devise  
14 new standards. The Petition is timely and Respondents have failed to show  
15 any jurisdictional error to warrant dismissal of that claim.

16  
17 **2. Because a Code Interpretation is no longer a required**  
18 **administrative remedy that must be exhausted, there was no**  
19 **requirement for administrative review.**

20 The Council’s change to the Interpretation requirements in 2017 also  
21 altered the appeal route in this situation. Before that Code change,  
22 Interpretations and a subsequent appeal to the Examiner were required  
23 administrative remedies that had to be exhausted before judicial review. Wall  
24 Decl. **Ex. 7 Interpretation amendment** (showing Code changes to SMC  
25 23.76.020.A and SMC 23.88.020). The Examiner’s decision was final and  
conclusive, subject to judicial review by state law. SMC 23.76.022.C.12. But

1 the Council eliminated that exhaustion requirement, in part because of the  
2 financial hardship on Appellants. Wall Decl, **Ex. 8 (Staff memo on**  
3 **interpretation amendment)**. As a result of that Code change, the only way to  
4 seek review of a Type 1 decision, without paying over \$3,000 for an  
5 Interpretation and then appealing that Interpretation to the Examiner, and then  
6 appealing an adverse decision to Court, is through direct judicial review, in a  
7 consolidated appeal. *See e.g.*, SMC 23.76.02 (consolidation of appeals for all  
8 land use decisions). But that can only occur after the final “land use decision”  
9 is made. Accordingly, Petitioners were not required to request (and appeal) an  
10 interpretation as part of the contract rezone proceedings, and were not  
11 otherwise required to seek any administrative review of a Type I Decision. And  
12 because SDCI had not issued any “final” decisions on April 9, 2018, there was  
13 no LUPA appeal clock that started on that date from a final decision to which  
14 the Type 1 appeal would be consolidated. To the extent Respondents wish to  
15 construe §7.4 as a challenge to the application of development standards, it  
16 was timely because there was no required administrative review of any Zoning  
17 Decision allegedly made on April 9, 2018, and there was no other decision that  
18 became final until the August 6, 2018 Council land use decision approving the  
19 rezone and the PUDA, conditioning the project.

20  
21 **3. SDCI Documents dated after April 9, 2018 also confirm**  
22 **that SDCI had not yet made a Type I, appealable “Zoning**  
23 **Decision” pursuant to LUPA as of April 9, 2018.**

24 The SDCI file for this project contains two correction notices that  
25 undermine Respondents’ argument that an appealable Zoning Decision was  
made on April 9, 2018. A Correction Notice dated April 23, 2018 states that “I

1 am unable to review or approve the construction permit application until after  
2 the MUP decision has been published and the contract rezone approval  
3 process has ended.” Wall Decl., **Ex. 18, April 23, 2018 Correction Notice.**  
4 And a Correction Notice issued over nearly a month later and dated May 17,  
5 2018, after the Hearing Examiner’s Record had closed, states that “The zoning  
6 review will start when MUP #3023280 has been approved and is ready to be  
7 issued. . . .All information provided in the MUP (zoning analysis and diagrams)  
8 should be included in the building permit drawings.” Wall Decl., **Ex. 19, May**  
9 **17, 2018 Correction Notice.**

10           There was not and could not have been a jurisdiction-killing Type I  
11 “Zoning Decision” made on April 9, 2018 when issues concerning use of the  
12 “development site” artifice employed to violate access and setback limitations  
13 remained in play before both the Hearing Examiner and the City Council. The  
14 City Council, not SDCl, made the final determination on this project.

15  
16           **D. Respondents’ position would lead to an absurd result**

17           Not only does Respondents’ argument find no support in the LUPA  
18 jurisdictional requirements or in the Land Use Code provisions for contract  
19 rezone decisions, it would lead to an absurd result that is contrary to the  
20 purpose of LUPA.

21           The stated purpose of LUPA is “to reform the process for judicial review  
22 of land use decisions made by local jurisdictions, by establishing uniform,  
23 expedited appeal procedures and uniform criteria for reviewing such decisions,  
24 in order to provide consistent, predictable, and timely judicial review.” RCW  
25

1 36.70C.010 (Emphasis added.). There would not be uniform or expedited  
2 appeal procedures in a contract rezone case under Respondents' world order.

3 Under Respondents' reasoning in this case, Petitioners should have  
4 appealed the Type I Decision (if one had been made) to Superior Court within  
5 21 days after the April 9, 2018 decision (even though it didn't meet the  
6 definition of a final decision appealable under LUPA). But meanwhile, would  
7 the Examiner still proceed with the open record hearing on the rezone? If the  
8 Examiner imposed conditions on the project that differed from SDCI's "Zoning  
9 Decision," would that too be appealable? Would City Council review of the  
10 contract rezone then be put on hold for the judicial process to run its course,  
11 even though the Council might again change the development? The piecemeal  
12 review of interlocutory decisions on projects that have not advanced to a final  
13 design would set up an unworkable scheme that would violate the purpose of  
14 LUPA and a rationale behind requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies.

15 There was no Type I Decision that was a "land use decision" within the  
16 meaning of LUPA that SDCI made on Aril 9, and accordingly, Petitioners did  
17 not miss any deadline that deprives this court of jurisdiction.

18  
19 **V. CONCLUSION**

20 For the reasons above, Respondents' Motion for Partial Summary  
21 Judgment should be denied.

22 //  
23 /


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DATED this 8th day of October, 2018.

ARAMBURU & EUSTIS, LLP

By

  
Jeffrey M. Eustis, WSBA #9262  
Attorney for Irene Wall and Robert  
Morgan

I, Jeffrey M. Eustis, certify that  
according to Word this memorandum  
does not exceed 8400 words  
(excluding the caption and signature  
blocks), fully in compliance with the  
Local Civil Rules  
(KCLCR7(b)(5)(B)(vi)).

